Theories, models and structures: thirty years on by French, S.R.D. & da Costa, N.
promoting access to White Rose research papers 
   
White Rose Research Online 
 
 
Universities of Leeds, Sheffield and York 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
   
 White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/3224/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published paper 
French, S.R.D. and da Costa, N. (2000) Theories, models and structures: thirty 
years on, Philosophy of Science, Volume 67, 116 – 127. 
  
 
 
 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk 
 
Models, Theories, and Structures: 

Thirty Years On 

Newton da C o s t a ' $  

University of SBo Paulo 

Steven French 
University of Leeds 
Thirty years after the conference that gave rise to The Structure ofScient@c Theories, 
there is renewed interest in the nature of theories and models. However, certain crucial 
issues from thirty years ago are reprised in current discussions; specifically: whether the 
diversity of models in the science can be captured by some unitary account; and whether 
the temporal dimension of scientific practice can be represented by such an account. 
After reviewing recent developments we suggest that these issues can be accommodated 
within the partial structures formulation of the semantic or model-theoretic approach. 
1. Introduction: The Received View of Models. One of the many things that 
The Structure of Scientific Theories did was to thoroughly and forensically 
analyze the demise of the Received View. A critical factor in its death was 
the apparent failure to adequately accommodate the nature and role of 
models in scientific practice. Looking back thirty years we get a strong 
sense of what that well known philosopher of sport, Yogi Berra, called 
"dkja vu all over again": in 1968 Achinstein presented an array of different 
kinds of models and argued that they simply could not be embraced by 
the Received View (Achinstein 1968), while McMullin insisted that, when 
it came to model construction and elaboration, "the logician leaves aside 
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the temporal dimension of scientific procedures" (McMullin 1968, 390). 
Returning to the present, we find these two claims reprised in a series of 
criticisms of the Semantic Approach. Before considering these more recent 
works, it is useful to briefly remind ourselves of the earlier accounts. 
According to the Received View, a model is a model for a theory and 
thus just another interpretation of the theory's calculus (see, e.g., Braith- 
waite 1965). Why, then, use models at all in scientific thinking? Here 
Braithwaite, for example, draws a distinction between the 'modelists' and 
the 'contextualists'. The former answer that models are needed to provide 
an understanding of the theory. According to the 'contextualist', however, 
such understanding is given by the (theoretical) context, where this re- 
quires a semantic ascent from an uninterpreted calculus to an interpreta- 
tion. Models are therefore ultimately dispensable (cf. Carnap 1939, 68). 
At best they have an aesthetic, didactic, or heuristic value (ibid.) but are 
'quite unnecessary' when it comes to understanding or successfully apply- 
ing a theory. 
Moving forward thirty years, this answer has been seen as too meager 
even by the Received View's own standards. If models are just interpre- 
tations, Psillos asks, "Why not abandon [them] altogether and go just for 
theories?" (Psillos 1995, 109). That is just what Braithwaite and Carnap 
do, in effect. Of course, the Received View's answer seems too meager by 
current standards which call upon models "to concretise, specify or ap- 
proximately realise assumptions about the physical system described by 
the theory, as for instance is the case with the Bohr model of the atom 
and its embedding atomic theory" (ibid.). This is to insist on the 'modelist' 
view of models as lnodels of systems. The instance given of the Bohr model 
is telling: part of the motivation for the Received View's insistence that 
understanding should not be tied to the provision of a model surely lies 
with the perception that, as standardly interpreted, no such models and 
hence no such understanding could be supplied for the powerful new quan- 
tum mechanics that ultimately swept aside Bohr's model. 
However, not all theories are like quantum mechanics; does this ac- 
count put the Received View radically out of step with scientific practice? 
Not necessarily: as an interpretation a model need not be sound; its initial 
propositions need not be true, or thought to be true (Braithwaite 1965, 
225). As Braithwaite acknowledges, "Scientists frequently use quite imagi- 
nary models" (1965, 226), giving as an example 19th century mechanical 
models for optical theory (Psillos 1995). At this point the critic may focus 
on the structures involved: it is implausible to require that the formal 
structure of the theory and model be identical. The 'imaginary' optical 
models are not an interpretation of the calculus of any theory that would 
be recognized as such (Achinstein 1968, 239); the 'identity' at work here 
is typically only partial. 
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Nagel set greater store by the use of models, but still, by regarding them 
as just another interpretation of the theory, albeit one that was articulated 
"in terms of more or less familiar conceptual or visualisable materials" 
(Nagel 1961, 90), they are incorporated within 'as-if' thinking. Hence it 
would seem that the Received View must answer in the negative a second 
question: "Can models ever be a tool of discovering the furniture of the 
world?" (Psillos 1995, 110; cf. McMullin 1968, 385). Is the Received View 
then committed to antirealism (Psillos 1995, 11 l)? Not necessarily; a pro- 
ponent might argue that insofar as an 'as-if' attitude is not adopted with 
regard to those aspects of scientific practice that we are nevertheless un- 
comfortable in regarding as fully-fledged theories, they can be called 'theo-
runcula', or (affectionately) 'theorita' and still be understood in terms of 
interpretations of a calculus (Braithwaite 1965, 225). 
Nagel's characterization takes the model supplied as part of the (par- 
tial) interpretation of the theory as both a semantic model and an iconic 
one (Suppe 1977, 96-98). Thus the billiard ball model of a gas is iconic in 
that a collection of billiard balls is obviously only similar and not identical 
to a collection of atoms; and it is semantic in that an interpretation is 
given to the theorems of the theory in terms of the system of billiard balls 
such that the theorems come out true under the interpretation. However, 
Suppe argued that if the theorems are empirically true, then the semantic 
model would be the world and the billiard ball model could never be such. 
The likes of Braithwaite might reply that this is precisely why models are 
so dangerous: they encourage a confusion of their domain with that of 
the theory. 
What about McMullin7s temporal dimension? Here it is worth recalling 
Carnap's insistence that the interpretation of the calculus is necessarily 
incomplete and hence the system is left open to allow for the addition of 
new correspondence rules. The partiality of the interpretation and the 
openness of the system is expressed via the incompleteness of the set of 
such rules. As far as 'normal' science is concerned, what we have is the 
steady addition of new rules and the continual modification of the inter- 
pretation. 
As we all know, these correspondence rules were regarded by Suppes 
(1962) as obscuring the complex structural relationships between theories 
and the data and by Suppe as posing problems for theory individuation 
when change occurs at the experimental level (1977, 102-109). Both re- 
jected the Received View for identifying a theory with its linguistic for- 
mulation-the combination of theorems and correspondence rules. In- 
stead, theories are seen as extralinguistic entities which can be described 
by but not identified with, their linguistic formulations (Suppe 1977,221- 
230). In Suppe's terms, if such a formulation is empirically true it will 
describe both the actual world and the theory; hence the formulation will 
have two mathematical models. And if it is accepted that if the theory is 
correct then it can be said to stand in an iconic relation to the world, then 
the relationship between these two models is also ('probably') iconic. The 
issue of iconic models was thus addressed by the Semantic Approach from 
early on. 
2. Thirty Years On. Eight years on, in the 'Afterword' to Structures, Suppe 
claimed that "The semantic conception of theories . . . is the only serious 
contender to emerge as a replacement for the Received View analysis of 
theories" (1977, 709). Twenty years on, he insisted that "The Semantic 
Conception of Theories today probably is the philosophical analysis of 
the nature of theories most widely held among philosophers of science" 
(Suppe 1989, 3). Thirty years on and where are we? A vast amount of 
work has been undertaken on the nature of scientific models, their uses, 
and their relationship with theory. The Semantic Approach has been de- 
veloped further and applied across a range of case studies by van Fraassen, 
Giere, Hughes, Lloyd, Thompson, and Suppe himself. It is important to 
recall that at the heart of this approach lies the fundamental point that 
theories are to be regarded as structures. In modern mathematics, as is 
well known, the general notion of 'structure' has undergone extensive 
development, culminating in the (essentially syntactic) treatment of Bour- 
baki. The Bourbaki species of structures can then be identified with 
Suppes' set-theoretical predicates, thus providing the bridge to standard 
(mathematical) model theory (da Costa and Chuaqui 1988). In these 
terms, to axiomatize a theory is to define a set-theoretical predicate and 
the structures which satisfy this predicate are the models of the theory. 
However, even granted these developments, Suppe's claim might seem 
optimistic. At one extreme the structuralists continue to unfold their pro- 
gramme, struggling to overcome the criticism that the scholastic niceties 
of theory holons, partial potential models, and so forth, have been gained 
at the cost of a shallow analysis of the practice supposedly represented 
(Truesdell 1984). Despite recent attempts at greater depth, the programme 
occasionally dips into the absurd, as when the social aspects of science are 
accommodated by waving the set-theoretic wand with the magic words 
"Let S be the set of scientists . . . !" 
Towards the other extreme, the 'foregrounding' of practice leaves the 
structural aspects in the dark. Cartwright, famously, has argued that much 
of what goes on in science involves modeling which is independent from 
theory in methods and aims (Cartwright, Shomar, and Suarez 1995). In 
similar vein, Morrison has suggested that models may be 'functionally 
autonomous' from theories and hence 'mediate' between them and the 
phenomena (Morrison forthcoming). This emphasis on the autonomy of 
models brings with it a welcome re-focus on both their diversity and heu- 
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ristic role. In both cases a challenge is set for the Semantic Approach just 
as it was for the Received View; can it be met? 
3. The Autonomy of Models. The focus of Cartwright et al.'s concern is 
the 'covering law' account of the relationship between theories and mod- 
els. Thus they claim that 
This account gives us a kind of homunculus image of model creation: 
Theories have a belly-full of tiny already-formed models buried within 
them. It takes only a the midwife of deduction to bring them forth. On 
the semantic view, theories are just collections of models; this view of- 
fers then a modern Japanese-style automated version of the covering- 
law account that does away even with the midwife. (Cartwright, Sho- 
mar, and Suarez 1995, 139) 
The counterexample they give is that of the London and London model 
of superconductivity which, they claim, was developed at the phenome- 
nological level, independent of theory in methods and aims. This latter 
claim has been considered and rejected elsewhere (French and Ladyman 
1997); what we want to focus on here is the assertion that the semantic 
view is nothing more than an up-to-date version of the covering-law ac- 
count. The argument goes as follows: According to the Semantic Ap- 
proach theories are families of mathematical models; if this approach is 
an adequate representation of scientific practice then any scientific model 
should feature as a member of such a family; however, there are models 
which do not so feature, since they are developed independently of theory; 
hence the Semantic Approach is not an adequate representation of sci- 
entific practice. While valid, this argument is not sound since the second 
premise does not represent the correct understanding of the semantic ap- 
proach's view of models. Let us suppose it is true that there exist models 
which were developed in a manner that was independent of theory. Still, 
they can be represented in terms of structures which satisfy certain Suppes 
predicates. 
Similar remarks apply to Morrison's account of the 'autonomy' of 
models. She presents the example of Prandtl's model of a fluid with a very 
thin boundary layer (Morrison 1999). This solved the problem of the 
apparent empirical inadequacy of the 'classical' treatment of viscous flow. 
The origin of this model lies in Prandtl's own experiments using a water 
tunnel in which the thin layer of high viscous stress around a solid body 
becomes visible. With this conceptual division of the fluid into two regions 
one can obtain two sets of solvable equations, one for the boundary layer, 
the other for the rest of the fluid, treated as ideal. Although these 
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solutions are dependent on the structural constraints supplied by the clas- 
sical equations, and so there is no independence from theory in that sense, 
the model itself was developed not by simplifying the mathematics of the 
classical treatment but came directly from the phenomenology of the phys- 
ics. Again it is suggested that the Semantic Approach is incapable of ac- 
commodating such models. 
We can simply repeat what we noted above: that whether a model is 
obtained by deduction from theory or by reflecting on experiment, it can 
be brought under the wings of the Semantic Approach by representing it 
in structural terms. There is a general point here: surely no one in their 
right minds would argue that all model development in the sciences pro- 
ceeds deductively! Of course experimental considerations may play a role 
and in particular they may lead to a reconceptualization of the phenom- 
ena. The London and London and Prandtl examples are identical in this 
respect: in both cases there was a crucial experiment-driven reconceptual- 
ization of the relevant phenomena. In the London and London case, it 
was the realization, driven by the discovery of the Meissner Effect, that 
the phenomenon of superconductivity should be understood, not as a case 
of infinite conductivity, but as analogous to diamagnetism. In the Prandtl 
case, the reconceptualization was, of course, the representation of fluid 
flow in terms of two different regions, again driven by Prandtl's own ex- 
periments. Other cases of model development dependent on such recon- 
ceptualisations of phenomena may be extracted from the history of sci- 
ence. That such models may then become the focus of scientific activity 
and thus become 'functionally autonomous' is not surprising given the 
difficulties in relating them to the appropriate theory. In the London and 
London example it took another twenty years or so before the develop- 
ment of the BCS theory, although the notion of 'Cooper pairs' was already 
hinted at in their 1935 paper. Fritz London himself insisted that such 
autonomy should be regarded as only temporary and indicated via struc- 
tural similarities with high level (quantum) theory how one might proceed 
to the essential further stage of showing how the model could be obtained 
from such theory (French and Ladyman 1997). 
A further argument is that models are vepvesentationally autonomous 
from theory, again in a way that cannot be captured by the Semantic 
Approach. Morrison insists that models are explanatory because "they 
exhibit certain kinds of structural dependencies" (1999, 39). However, 
models make these structural dependencies evident in a way that abstract 
theory cannot and hence, again, they act as "autonomous agents" (ibid., 
40). In the cases of hydrodynamic and nuclear models, in particular, "they 
provide the only mechanism that allows us to represent and understand 
. . . experimental phenomena" (ibid.). Thus models are representa-
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tional, whereas theories are not.' However, two sorts of cases need to be 
considered in order to evaluate such a claim. 
In the first, a theory exists but the relationship with the relevant model 
is not the standard one. An example might be the models of quantum 
chemistry which, because of the many-body problem, for one reason, can- 
not be deduced directly from Schrodinger's equation (Hendry 1998). Nev- 
ertheless high-level considerations play a role in constraining the form of 
the possible models at the lower, 'phenomenological', level and it is diffi- 
cult to see how they could be straightforwardly ruled out as completely 
non-representational. Indeed, Morrison herself admits to a spectrum of 
explanatory and representational power as she acknowledges that models 
incorporate "more detail" about structural dependencies than high level 
theory. 
Second, a model might be 'autonomous' in the sense that it is just not 
clear yet how it might be related to high level theory. This was the case of 
the London-London model with respect to qualzturn theory (it was clearly 
not autonomous from Maxwellian electrodynamics). A further example is 
Fritz London's own explanation of the behavior of liquid helium in terms 
of Bose-Einstein statistics, where the extent of the idealizations required 
to connect the quantum statistics of an ideal gas with a superfluid force 
the detachability of the model (at least until Feynman came along; see 
London 1954, 59-60) 
In these cases the 'autonomy' is relative and only temporary. Hartmann 
has explored this idea that such models are examples of 'preliminary phys- 
ics' (Hartmann 1995, 52; see also Redhead 1980). Of course this prelimi- 
nary stage may last many years, as in the superconductivity case and, as 
Hartmann himself acknowledges, this is not sufficient grounds for distin- 
guishing models from theories. 
4. The Diachronic Development of Models. In his 1995, Hartmann draws 
a distinction between what he calls the 'static' and 'diachronic' view of 
models. The former describes what models are; the latter is concerned with 
their construction and development. The crux of the above criticisms of 
the Semantic Approach is that by being wedded to a particular static view 
of models-by tying them deductively to theories-a particular diaclzronic 
view is forced in which model development can only proceed 'from the 
top down'. We are arguing here that the Semantic Approach is not so 
1. What is needed is further discussion of the way in which models and theories rep- 
resent. Hughes offers a semantic account, according to which 'global' theories, such as 
quantum mechanics represent insofar as they define a class of 'local' models-such as 
Bohr's model of the atom -which denote, and thus represent, types of systems (Hughes 
1997). On such a view, both models and theories are representational. 
wedded and that the diachronic aspects of actual practice can be accom- 
modated. As McMullin noted, thirty years ago, it is crucial to this dia- 
chronic aspect that models contain 'surplus content', which will allow for 
extensions which, in turn, may be both suggested and yet unexpected (391; 
cf. Hesse 1963, Braithwaite 1962); that is, the models are heuristically 
fruitful. Can the Semantic Approach accommodate this suggested unex- 
pectedness (or what Peirce called the 'esperable uberty') and hence respond 
to McMullin's criticism? 
One possibility is to extend it by incorporating partial relations into the 
set-theoretical structures, where a partial relation defined on a set2 A can 
be introduced as follows: if R is binary, then it is taken to be an ordered 
triple (R,, R,, R,), where R,, R,, and R, are mutually disjoint sets such 
that R,  U R2 U R, = A2; R1 is the set of ordered pairs which satisfy R, 
R2 is the set of ordered pairs which do not satisfy R, and R, is the set of 
ordered pairs for which it is left open whether they satisfy R or not. When 
R, is empty, R constitutes a normal binary relation and can be identified 
with R,. In this manner, the openness of scientific developments can be 
accommodated (Bueno 1997, da Costa and French 1990, French and La- 
dyman 1997). Room is now opened up for heuristic considerations and 
there is no obstacle in principle to capturing this further aspect of mod- 
eling, as emphasised by McMullin and reprised by Hartmann, using the 
resources afforded by set theory (French 1997). 
5. Iconic Models and Analogies. Let us return to the example of nuclear 
models, for which Morrison argues that there can be no single high-level 
theory to carry representation and understanding, because the models are 
contradictory. Such a case goes right to the heart of our discussion as the 
possibility of accommodating just these models was one of the reasons 
explicitly given by Suppes for adopting the Semantic Approach (Suppes 
1967). Each such model captures a certain important aspect of the behav- 
ior of the nucleus; fission, say, in the case of the liquid drop model, or 
angular momentum in that of the shell model. The role of analogy in 
constructing these models was, of course, fundamental. The representation 
of the nucleus as a charged liquid drop rides on the back of the saturation 
properties exhibited by nuclear forces. The analogy cannot be pushed too 
far: if it is to be conceptualized in this way, the nuclear interior is not a 
classical liquid, of course, but a Fermi-Dirac one (for details see Heyde 
1994, 191-192). Here high-level theoretical aspects intrude into the 'semi- 
empirical model', leading, in the case of quantum statistics, all the way up 
to group theory. And group theory features prominently in the description 
2. It is important to note that the set-theoretic models are constructed in set theories 
with Urelemente (individual, systems, portions of the universe, real things, . . . ). 
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of the alternative model Morrison discusses, the shell model. Here the 
analogy is with the atom as a whole, specifically the picture of electrons 
moving in the atom, and more specifically still, it holds between the ion- 
ization energy of electrons and the neutronlproton separation energy. 
Again the analogy rests on certain crucial idealizations, since nucleons do 
not move independently in an average field, of course (see Heyde 1990). 
And again very high level theoretical considerations play an important 
role in articulating the model. Thus the models may be functionally in- 
dependent from quantum chromodynamics, this being the result of a lack 
of appropriate meshing of the various energy regimes, but they are not so 
independent from all theory. Again, the functional independence may be 
transitory as physicists explore various ways of reconciling the apparent 
inconsistencies between these models. 
The analogies in these cases only hold in certain respects; in others they 
definitely do not, and in still others, we simply do not know. As is well 
known, Hesse captured this tripartite nature of analogy in her division 
into positive, negative, and neutral analogies (Hesse 1962). The last, in 
particular, was seen as fundamental by Hesse herself, since it allowed mod- 
els to be genuinely predictive and thus essential to scientific practice (see 
Suppe 1977, 99-102).' It is the exploration of the space of these neutral 
analogies which underpins the crucial heuristic role of models (Psillos 
1995, 113). How might the openness of this space and the concomitant 
neutrality of the analogy be represented? 
Again, this can be done using partial structures, where Hesse's three 
distinctions map nicely onto R,, R,, and R, above respectively. Likewise 
her distinction between formal and material analogies can be straightfor- 
wardly accommodated. With regard to the former, these may be captured 
by introducing partial isomorphisms (cf. Czarnocka 1995, 31) holding be- 
tween the partial structures (French and Ladyman forthcoming, Bueno 
1997, French and Ladyman 1997). This gives us a formal, set-theoretical 
and of course, essentially structuralist, grasp on both the openness to fur- 
ther developments of theories and models, and the interrelationships be- 
tween them. The inconsistency between different nuclear models may then 
be resolved as scientists explore the open parts of the structures and relate 
them to further theoretical ones4 
Notice the shift that has occurred: Suppe tied the iconic aspect of mod- 
3. Psillos has recently revived Hesse's 'analogical' approach (Psillos 1995); for an earlier 
criticism see Achinstein 1968. 
4. Frisch has also pointed out that no (classical) models can be used to represent an 
inconsistent theory, such as Maxwellian electrodynamics (Frisch preprint); that the 
issue of inconsistency in science poses no special problems for the Semantic Approach 
has been argued in da Costa and French forthcoming. 
els to high-level theory. Cartwright, Morrison, and others have objected 
that models exist which are not so tied. The partial structures approach 
offers a means of representing the latter directly and accommodating the 
various relationships which hold between models and theories. In this 
manner we can represent the role of analogies in model construction and 
also its piecemeal nature which recent accounts have emphasized (the liq- 
uid drop model in particular is dealt with in da Costa and French 1990).5 
Again, there is a sense in which we have been here before. Schaffner 
pointed out that a range of these 'interlevel, middle range' models might 
be drawn upon in any one description of a particular system and suggested 
that fuzzy sets be introduced to accommodate them (Suppe 1989, 275). 
Suppe has rejected such an extension of the Semantic Approach, arguing 
that these models may be accommodated via 'laws of quasi-succession', 
in which only a subset of the basic parameters of the theory are listed, 
where this subset gives the 'internal substate' of the system (1989, 158). 
With those parameters outside of this subset characterizing the 'external 
substate' of the system, a law of quasi-succession characterizes systems 
for which subsequent internal substates but not external substates are a 
function of prior complete states of the system (1989, 159). Those situa- 
tions in which relevant aspects of the states of a system are determined 
from 'outside' the theory concerned, can then be represented. However, if 
(some of) the parameters defining the external substate are unknown, the 
laws of quasi-succession might be represented set-theoretically in terms of 
partial structures. 
6. Conclusion: The Representation of Practice. Perhaps the most funda- 
mental issues we are faced with in the philosophy of science is the repre- 
sentation of scientific practice. As philosophers, sociologists, historians, 
or whatever, we are faced with this rich, complex practice, or set of prac- 
tices, which are tied up with theories, models, hypotheses, instruments, 
etc. The issue then becomes how we are to 'get a handle' on, how we are 
to represent, these elements in order to better understand this practice. At 
one extreme we might employ a highly developed formal approach which 
seeks to represent various distinctions found in scientific practice in highly 
technical terms. The dangers of such an approach are well known: seduced 
by the scholastic angels dancing on the formal pinhead, we lose sight of 
the practice we are trying to understand. At the other extreme we might 
adopt an Austinian line, beginning with some nuanced taxonomy and 
describing the various ins and outs, differences, and similarities of practice 
5. More generally, it has been argued that certain sorts of models are just not amenable 
to a set-theoretic treatment (Downes 1992). A response in terms of this framework is 
given in French and Ladyman 1999. 
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in ordinary language terms. The dangers here are equally well known: 
without a clear unifying framework, our account collapses into dry reci- 
tation of the 'facts' of practice-a kind of crude positivism at the meta- 
level. The obvious move is to a point between these extremes, where the 
desire for some unitary framework is balanced with the need to keep a 
close eye on scientific practice itself. The analyses of theories and models 
of the past thirty years have contributed enormously to our understanding 
of scientific practice. Our intention here has been merely to indicate that 
a unitary and formal account might still possess the resources to accom- 
modate this richness and complexity. 
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